Part B

　　Directions:

　　In the following article, some sentences have been removed. For Questions 41-45, choose the most suitable one from the list A-F to fit into each of the numbered blank. There is one extra choice that does not fit in any of the gaps. Mark your answers on ANSWER SHEET 1.(10 points)

　　Theories of the value of art are of two kinds, which we may call extrinsic and intrinsic. The first regards art and the appreciation of art as means to some recognized moral good, while the second regards them as valuable not instrumentally but as objects unto themselves. It is characteristic of extrinsic theories to locate the value of art in its effects on the person who appreciates it. (41) .

　　The extrinsic approach, adopted in modern times by Leo Tolstoy in Chto takoye iskusstvo? (1896; What Is Art?), has seldom seemed wholly satisfactory. Philosophers have constantly sought for a value in aesthetic experience that is unique to it and that, therefore, could not be obtained from any other source. The extreme version of this intrinsic approach is that associated with Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde, and the French Symbolists, and summarized in the slogan “art for art’s sake.” (42) .

　　Between those two extreme views there lies, once again, a host of intermediate positions. We believe, for example, that works of art must be appreciated for their own sake, but that, in the act of appreciation, we gain from them something that is of independent value. (43) .

　　The analogy with laughter—which, in some views, is itself a species of aesthetic interest—introduces a concept without which there can be no serious discussion of the value of art: the concept of taste. (44) .

　　Similarly, we regard some works of art as worthy of our attention and others as not. In articulating this judgment, we use all of the diverse and confusing vocabulary of moral appraisal; works of art, like people, are condemned for their sentimentality, coarseness, vulgarity, cruelty, or self-indulgence, and equally praised for their warmth, compassion, nobility, sensitivity, and truthfulness. (The same may apply to the object of natural beauty.) Clearly, if aesthetic interest has a positive value, it is only when motivated by good taste; it is only interest in appropriate objects that can be said to be good for us. (45) .

　　[A] Thus a joke is laughed at for its own sake, even though there is an independent value in laughter, which lightens our lives by taking us momentarily outside ourselves. Why should not something similar be said of works of art, many of which aspire to be amusing in just the way that good jokes are?

　　[B] All discussion of the value of art tends, therefore, to turn from the outset in the direction of criticism: Can there be genuine critical evaluation of art, a genuine distinction between that which deserves our attention and that which does not? (And, once again, the question may be extended to objects of natural beauty.)

　　[C] Art is held to be a form of education, perhaps an education of the emotions. In this case, it becomes an open question whether there might not be some more effective means to the same result. Alternatively, one may attribute a negative value to art, as Plato did in his Republic, arguing that art has a corrupting or diseducative effect on those exposed to it.

　　[D] Artistic appreciation, a purely personal matter, calls for appropriate means of expression. Yet, it is before anything a process of “cultivation”, during which a certain part of one’s “inner self” is “dug out” and some knowledeg of the outside world becomes its match.

　　[E] If I am amused it is for a reason, and this reason lies in the object of my amusement. We thus begin to think in terms of a distinction between good and bad reasons for laughter. Amusement at the wrong things may seem to us to show corruption of mind, cruelty, or bad taste; and when it does so, we speak of the object as not truly amusing, and feel that we have reason on our side.

　　[F] Such thinkers and writers believe that art is not only an end in itself but also a sufficient justification of itself. They also hold that in order to understand art as it should be understood, it is necessary to put aside all interests other than an interest in the work itself.

　　答案

　　41.C 42.F 43.A 44.E 45.B

　　试题精解

　　41.[精解] 本题考核的知识点是：上下文内容的衔接。

　　本题空格出现在第一段末。第一段前两句提出了两种艺术价值理论：外在理论和内在理论。空格处的上一句，即第三句和空格处后的第一句，即第二段第一句都是对外在理论的讨论。所以，空格处的内容应该与上下文一致，也对外在价值理论予以讨论。选项[C]是关于艺术对于艺术欣赏者的影响，属于外在价值理论的观点，且恰好是对其上一句的阐释。

　　42. [精解] 本题考核知识点：上下文内容的衔接 + 段落主题 + 指代词的理解。

　　本题空格出现在第二段末。从上文来看，第二段的第二句开始由对艺术外在价值理论的讨论转入对艺术内在价值理论的讨论。从下文来看，紧接空格处的第三段第一句指出：这两种极端理论之间还有一些折中的观点。所以，空格处内容肯定是对内在价值理论的讨论。[F]为合适选项。且其中的such thinkers and writers恰好指上文提到的 Walter Pater, Oscar Wilde and the French Symbolists，上下文之间衔接自然。

　　43. [精解] 本题考核知识点：上下文内容的衔接 + 段落主题。

　　本空格的上文指出： 艺术外在价值理论和艺术内在价值理论之间存在着折中的观点：对于艺术的欣赏应该基于艺术本身(内在)，而对艺术的欣赏过程中则会有独立价值的东西(外在)。下文中提到：这种和笑声的类比本身就是一种审美价值。所以，空格处必定是利用“笑声”来类比折中的艺术价值理论。[A]说明：笑声是因为笑话本身的可笑(内在)，但笑声又有其独立的价值——点亮我们的生活(外在价值)。恰好符合上下文的衔接，为正确选项。

　　44. [精解] 本题考核知识点：和上文内容的衔接 + 副词的运用。

　　本空格的上文刚刚引出了一个新的抽象概念：品味。空格的下文利用simiarly说明，审美价值也正面和负面之分。紧接着，在审美价值(aesthetic interest)和品味(taste)之间建立联系。所以，空格处内容必然是对“品味”进行解释，并说明品味有好坏之分。这恰恰是选项[E]的内容

　　45. [精解] 本题考核知识点：对上文内容的总结

　　本空格出现在文章结尾处，所以必然是对上文内容的总结，[B]中 “all discussion of the value of art tends, therefore”非常适合做全文内容的总结。再对[B]的内容进行分析，其恰好是基于全文的讨论，利用一个疑问句指出对艺术价值评判的关键问题：是否真的存在真正的临界评价。

　　全文翻译

　　艺术价值理论有两种，我们称之为外在理论和内在理论。前者将艺术和对艺术的欣赏看作是达到某种公认的道德利益的手段;而后者看到的不是它们工具性的价值而是投向自身物体的价值。外在理论的特点是将艺术价值定位于其对艺术欣赏者的影响。艺术被认为是一种教育形式，也许是一种情感教育。在这种情况下，是否有一些达到同样效果的更有效的方法成了公开的问题。或者，人们也许认为艺术有负面价值，正如柏拉图在他的《理想国》一书里所认为的那样，艺术会影响那些接触它的人，使其堕落，或起不到教化作用。[C]

　　现代社会中被列夫托尔斯泰吸收进1896年出版的《艺术论》一书中的外在理论，似乎不能完全令人满意。哲学家们一直在不懈地探索唯美体验中的价值。这种价值是独一无二的，因此不能从别处获得。极端的内在理论与华特·佩特、奥斯卡·王尔德及法国印象主义者联系在一起，总结为一句口号：“为艺术而艺术”。这些思想家和作家相信：艺术的目的在于其本身，而且艺术也是对其自身的证明。他们还相信，若要以正确的方式理解艺术，必须放弃对其他方面的关注而只关注艺术作品本身。[F]

　　在这两种极端的观点之间，有一些折中的观点。比如，我们认为对艺术品的欣赏必须基于作品本身，而我们在欣赏过程中能从中获得一些独立的价值。对笑话发笑是因为笑话本身可笑，但笑声本身又有独立的价值，这一价值使得使我们能在片刻间脱离自己，点亮生活。在这一点上，艺术作品又何尝不具有相似性?许多艺术作品渴望着与好的笑话一样具有娱乐性。[A]

　　有些人认为，这种和笑声的类比本身就是一种审美价值。它引进了一个新的概念——品味。若没有这一概念，就不可能对艺术价值做严肃的讨论。若我感到有趣，肯定有其原因。此“原因”存在于令我感到有趣的对象。因此，我们开始考虑对令人发笑的好的原因和坏的原因进行区分。对不好的事情感到有趣说明我们思想堕落、残忍或审美眼光差;出现这样的情况，我们会说对象本身并不真正有趣，我们之所以感到有趣是因为我们自身的原因。[E]

　　与之相似的是，我们认为某些艺术品值得关注，而另外一些却不值得。在作此判断时，我们会利用各种令人费解的、评判道德的词汇; 艺术品和人一样，会因为其感伤、粗俗、残忍、或自我放纵受到谴责，会因为其热情、同情、高尚、敏感和真实受到褒扬。显然，若要有积极的审美价值，必须有好的审美眼光;只有对恰当的物体感兴趣才对我们有益处。因此，所有对艺术价值的讨论都趋向背离了起初的评论方向：会有对艺术的真正临界评价吗?即，在值得关注的作品和不值得关注的作品之间，存在着真正的界限吗?[B]